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PENNSYLVANIA

-FOREIGN

CONSTITUTION-UNIFORMITY

CLAUSE-ExCISE TAX

AND DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS-The

Pennsylvania Su-

preme Court has held the Excise Tax on Foreign Corporations
unconstitutional since disparate tax treatment based solely on a
taxpayer's place of incorporation is an unreasonable classification
and is therefore violative of the uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Columbia Gas Transmis'ion Corp. v. Commonwealth, 360 A.2d
592 (Pa. 1976).
Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation (Columbia) is a foreign
corporation authorized to do business in Pennsylvania.' Pennsylvania, pursuant to an act entitled Excise Tax on Foreign Corporations,' levied upon foreign corporations an excise tax of one-third of

one percent on the amount of any increase of capital actually employed within the Commonwealth. 3 Domestic corporations were
taxed in the same period in which the tax on foreign corporations
accrued under the Bonus on Capital Stock Act.4 This tax on domes-

tic corporations was only one-fifth of one percent on the amount of
stated capital and any increase in the same.'
Columbia filed suit in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
seeking to enjoin imposition of the foreign excise tax. It alleged,
among other things, that the tax was violative of both the uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution.' The commonwealth court
1. See Columbia Gas Trans. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 523, 525, 339
A.2d 912, 914 (1975), rev'd, 360 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1976).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 8001-8006 (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977).
3. The statute reads in relevant part:
[Elvery foreign corporation, in addition to complying with all the laws of the Commonwealth now or hereafter in effect, shall, for the privilege of exercising its franchises
in Pennsylvania, pay . . . an excise tax of one-third of one per cent upon the amount
of any increase of capital actually employed within this Commonwealth . ...
Id. § 8002.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 §§ 1827.2-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977), (repealed by PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 803.8 (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977)).
5. Columbia Gas Trans: Corp. v. Commonwealth, 360 A.2d 592, 594-95 (Pa. 1976).
6. Columbia also contended that the foreign excise tax violated the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution as a tax on interstate commerce, that its increases in capital
were not properly apportioned under the applicable statutory formula, and that the credit
Columbia received for domestic excise taxes paid by its predecessor was improperly computed. 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 526-27, 339 A.2d at 915. The supreme court rested its decision
solely on the uniformity clause and found it unnecessary to deal with Columbia's other
contentions. 360 A.2d at 594 n.3. Cf. notes 34-38 and accompanying text infra.
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rejected Columbia's contentions of constitutional invalidity. It
started from the premise that Pennsylvania accepted, as a reasonable distinction, a classification based solely on place of incorporation.' Without referring to any justification offered by the Commonwealth for the different rates of taxation, the commonwealth court
declared that the foreign excise tax involved a reasonable classification and therefore did not contravene any constitutional provisions.8
In an opinion written by Justice Roberts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously reversed the commonwealth court and
declared the Excise Tax on Foreign Corporations violative of the
uniformity clause.' The court recognized that foreign and domestic
corporations, as a practical matter, cannot be taxed identically.
Absolute or perfect uniformity is not demanded by the uniformity
clause. 0 Rather, the state has broad taxing authority which includes
the power to classify subjects differently for tax purposes. In order
to meet the requirements of the uniformity clause, however, a classification must be based upon a reasonable difference between the
7. 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 539, 339 A.2d at 921. See notes 21-24 infra.
8. Id. at 538-43, 339 A.2d at 921-23.
9. 360 A.2d at 597. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never held that the parameters
of the Pennsylvania uniformity clause and the federal equal protection clause are identical,
but has generally looked to federal equal protection cases when a disparity in tax treatment
is presented. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co., 419 Pa. 370, 374 n.8, 214 A.2d
209, 213 n.8 (1965) (so far as the reasonableness of classifications for purposes of taxation is
concerned, uniformity clause and equal protection clause are "in pari materia"). See also
Commonwealth v. Budd Co., 379 Pa. 159, 167, 108 A.2d at 563, 566 (1954) (corporate net
income tax declared violative of the uniformity and equal protection clauses); Commonwealth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 565, 87 A.2d 255, 258 (1952) (license tax
imposed upon foreign insurance companies held nonviolative of the uniformity and equal
protection clauses since the tax merely created equality between foreign and domestic companies); Commonwealth v. Lukens, 312 Pa. 220, 224, 167 A. 167, 169 (1933) (classifying freight
and baggage transporting companies apart from passenger transporting companies not violative of uniformity and equal protection clauses); Commonwealth v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 305
Pa. 558, 562, 158 A. 262, 263 (1932) (tax levied against insurance companies based on their
corporate structure did not contravene either clause).
10. 360 A.2d at 595. See Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (ad valorem
tax imposed on stored merchandise owned by residents but exempting merchandise owned
by nonresidents not violative); Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co., 419 Pa. 370, 214 A.2d
209 (1965) (upholding tax imposed on all foreign insurance companies but only on domestic
life insurance companies). See also Commonwealth v. Brink's, Inc., 346 Pa. 296, 30 A.2d 128
(1943) (tax imposed on business of carrying passengers for hire but not on baggage carried
for hire not violative of uniformity clause).
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classes of taxpayers; otherwise, the distinction would be arbitrary
and capricious and constitutionally infirm."
Justice Roberts observed that the Commonwealth had not posited
a justification for the variant rates of taxation other than a corporation's place of incorporation. He relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro" for
the proposition that such a distinction, without more, was an insufficient basis for differing tax rates and did not pass "constitutional
scrutiny."' 3 Since the Commonwealth had not met its burden of
demonstrating a valid reason for the disparate rates, the foreign
excise tax violated the uniformity clause and was therefore unenforceable. 4
It is well established, in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, that classifying domestic and foreign corporations for tax purposes is within a
state legislature's broad discretionary power subject only to constitutional limitations." The traditional test evolved for determining
the validity of any classification is whether there is a reasonable
basis for the distinction, or whether any set of facts can reasonably
be conceived to sustain it.'" This minimal scrutiny standard places
11. See 360 A.2d at 595, and cases cited therein. In WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro,
393 U.S. 117 (1968), a nonprofit Pennsylvania corporation was authorized to do business in
New Jersey. Although New Jersey allowed exemptions to domestic nonprofit organizations,
it did not exempt similar organizations incorporated outside the state. The New -Jersey
Superior Court held that the tax classifications did not violate the equal protection clause.
91 N.J. Super. 269, 219 A.2d 893 (1966). The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding
no rational basis for the distinction. The Court concluded that appellant had been denied
equal treatment because the distinction was based solely on the different residence of the
owner and not because of any difference in the state's relation to the decisive transaction.
393 U.S. at 120. For further analysis of the relationship between Columbia and WHYY see
text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
12. 393 U.S. 117 (1968). See note 11 supra.
13. 360 A.2d at 595.
14. Id. at 597.
15. E.g., Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959); Commonwealth v. Life
Assurance Co., 419 Pa. 370, 376, 214 A.2d 209, 214 (1965); Jones & Laughlin Tax Assessment
Case, 405 Pa. 421, 433-34, 175 A.2d 856, 862 (1961). See notes 16-19 infra.
16. See Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959), and cases cited therein. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently upheld, for tax purposes, classifications between different types of organizations or functions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co., 419 Pa. 370, 214 A.2d 209 (1965) (domestic life and nonlife insurance companies);
Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948) (strip mining of coal and deep mining or
quarrying of other substances); Philadelphia v. Samuels, 338 Pa. 321, 12 A.2d 79 (1940) (open
and closed parking lots); Commonwealth v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 558, 158 A. 262 (1932)
(classification of life insurance companies based on differing corporate structure); Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab Co., 287 Pa. 161, 134 A. 404, rev'd on othergrounds, 277 U.S. 389
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the burden upon the taxpayer challenging the tax to prove that no
rational basis for the classification exists. 7 Absent such a showing,
the classification will not be deemed arbitrary and capricious and
in violation of constitutional standards." In some instances, courts
themselves have discerned a reasonable basis even when the legislature has not stated the purpose for a particular classification. 9 The
(1926) (corporate and individual taxicab owners). As early as 1905, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in sustaining the constitutionality of a classification of real estate having the
same market value into three different classes stated: "It is too late in the day in Pennsylvania to question the power of the legislature to classify subjects of taxation on broad lines
and within certain limitations. The reasons for such classificaton, based upon imperious
necessity, are . . . numerous, and have been . . .frequently discussed by the higher courts
... ."Jermyn v. Scranton City, 212 Pa. 598, 602, 62 A. 29, 31 (1905).
17. Both state and federal courts have employed a rational basis standard of review to
uphold various tax classifications. See, e.g., Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959)
(resident and nonresident owners of merchandise in state warehouses); Bell's Gap R.R. v.
Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890) (tax on face value of bonds rather than actual value); Alco
Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. 245, 307 A.2d 851 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 417
U.S. 369 (1974) (commercial and public parking lots); Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co.,
419 Pa. 370, 214 A.2d 209 (1965) (domestic life and nonlife insurers); Commonwealth v.
Girard Life Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 558, 158 A. 262 (1932) (classification based on insurance companies' corporate structure).
There have been instances where no rational basis for a classification was found and the
tax was therefore invalidated. See, e.g., WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117
(1968) (foreign and domestic companies of similar nature). The test of reasonableness is
applied on a case by case basis. It has been stated repeatedly that there is no "iron rule" of
equal taxation. That is, each classification will be examined and if a reasonable justification
exists for it, it will be upheld. See Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, supra at 526, and cases cited
therein.
In Life Assurance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized the purpose and guidelines of the test for reasonableness and its effects:"
[Tihe essential question in testing the validity of [legislative determinations of classifications] is whether the distinctive treatment accorded rests upon substantial differences between the subjects so classified. . . .And where such distinctions rest upon
differences recognized and acted upon by the business world, it is not within the
province of the courts to intrude. . . .So long as the classification is neither capricious
nor arbitrary, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law.
419 Pa. at 378-79, 214 A.2d at 215 (citations omitted).
18. Cases involving the constitutionality of tax classifications have placed the burden on
the taxpayer to prove there is no reasonable justification for the distinction in question. See,
e.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931) (classification based upon
number of retail stores owned); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912) (classification
of hand and steam laundries); Philadelphia v. Depuy, 431 Pa. 276, 244 A.2d 741 (1968)
(municipal electric and gas companies); Commonwealth v. Lukens, 312 Pa. 220, 167 A. 167
(1933) (classification of operations transporting passengers and freight).
19. See Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959), and cases cited therein. In
Allied, the bases for the classification were not posited by the defendant, but the Court
observed that a state legislature need not explicitly declare its purpose and went on to discuss
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commonwealth court's employment of the minimal scrutiny test in
Columbia to determine whether the foreign excise tax was an arbitrary and capricious classification was therefore consistent with past
judicial standards for determining who should bear the burden of
demonstrating the absence or existence of a constitutional justification for the particular tax measure. 0
Although the Pennsylvania courts have upheld a multitude of
classifications involving the taxation of domestic corporations and
businesses,' the propriety of classifying foreign and domestic taxpayers has not been extensively litigated in Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, existing case law in Pennsylvania seemed to support the view
that a tax classification based on a corporation's state of incorporation would pass muster under the uniformity clause regardless of
whether the Commonwealth presented any other justification for
the uneven tax treatment. Germania Life Insurance Co. v.
Common-wealth,"2 cited by the commonwealth court in Columbia,
was one of the earliest decisions examining the foreign-domestic
distinction. Germania,a nineteenth century case, involved a foreign
corporation doing business in Pennsylvania that was taxed at a rate
different than the rate for domestic corporations."2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that foreign corporations may be placed
in a class and taxed apart from domestic corporations." The
Germania court did not address the question of who was to bear the
burden of establishing a justification for distinctive tax treatment,
but the clear implication was that the foreign-domestic distinction
was constitutionally justified where similar companies were incorporated in different states.
Had Germania been the only relevant precedent, perhaps the
commonwealth court would have questioned the decision's continuing vitality. The court perceived that decision to have been revitalpossible bases the legislature could have intended. The Supreme Court found a conceivable
basis for the classification and held the tax enforceable. Id. at 528-30.
20. Compare id. at 528, with 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 542, 339 A.2d at 923: "Further, the
classifications will be upheld if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain them. The Foreign Excise Tax on Corporations meets these tests."
21. See cases cited at note 16 supra.
22. 85 Pa. 513 (1877) (per curiam).
23. Germania, a foreign insurance corporation, was taxed at a rate of three percent on
premiums paid to the corporation while domestic insurance companies were taxed only one
half mill for each one percent of dividends made. Id. at 514.
24. Id. at 519.
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ized, however, by more recent Pennsylvania cases which did not
involve a distinction between domestic and foreign corporations but
arguably reaffirmed the result as well as the standard of review used
in Germania. In both Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co.25 and
2" the Pennsylvania Supreme
Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh,
Court upheld taxing classifications using a rational basis standard.Y
The court in both of these cases stated that the burden of showing
a classification employed by the Commonwealth to be not reasonable lies with the party attacking the tax." Life Assurance cited
Germaniaas precedent for sustaining distinctive tax treatment due
to bona fide differences between corporations,2 9 and in Alco the
court added that a taxpayer's burden of proving that a particular
3'
classification is unreasonable is "a heavy one."
The supreme court's opinion in Columbia appears to represent a
break from its prior view on the relationship between the state's
taxing power and those subject to the tax. Although it was not
expressly overruled, it seems clear Germaniacannot stand alongside
the Columbia court's approval of the Supreme Court reasoning in
WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro.3 ' The court in Columbia did
not address the question whether the commonwealth court had
properly interpreted the prior decisions in Life Assurance and Alco,
but rather distinguished Life Assurance factually 32 and did not refer
to Alco. Yet, from the standpoint of assigning the burden of proof,
these three cases are difficult to reconcile. The taxpayer in
Columbia showed no more than a disparity in taxing rates, 3 and the
25. 419 Pa. 370, 214 A.2d 209 (1965).
26. 453 Pa. 245, 307 A.2d 851 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
27. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra.
28. 419 Pa. at 376-77, 214 A.2d at 214; 453 Pa. at 255, 307 A.2d at 857.
29. 419 Pa. at 379, 214 A.2d at 215-16.
30. 453 Pa. at 255, 307 A.2d at 857. See note 18 supra.
31. 393 U.S. 117 (1968). See note 11 supra; note 38 infra. See also Hanover Fire Ins. Co.
v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926i (net receipts tax on foreign corporations held an unlawful
discrimination against foreign companies in favor of domestic companies of the same class
and therefore violative of the equal protection clause); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S..400
(1910) (franchise tax based upon foreign corporation's stock within the taxing state is an
arbitrary classification based only on place of incorporation).
32. The court stated that Life Assurance was inapposite because there a rational basis
existed for the tax rate distinction. 360 A.2d at 596. A rational basis for the disparate tax
treatment also existed in Alco, since certain traffic-related problems were engendered by
commercial parking lot operations which justified classifying them separately from public
parking lots for tax treatment. 453 Pa. 245, 257, 307 A.2d 851, 858 (1973).
33. See 360 A.2d at 595.
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supreme court seems to have relegated to the Commonwealth the
onus of setting forth valid reasons for taxing one class of subjects
differently than another class.3 4 Without directly confronting the
issue of the continued vitality of Germania, the court relied on
WHYY to effectively emasculate Germania'sholding that a distinction based solely upon place of incorporation was a reasonable classification. In WHYY, the United States Supreme Court held that a
classification based solely on state of incorporation was not a rational basis for distinction and therefore was in contravention of the
fourteenth.amendment equal protection clause. 35 The Columbia
court apparently accepted the principle that foreign corporations,
once allowed entry into a state, are to be treated uniformly with
domestic corporations; a distinction based merely upon the place Of
incorporation is an arbitrary standard of classification.3 6 Although
the Columbia court said only that the foreign-domestic classification violated the Pennsylvania uniformity clause,37 it probably could
have reached the same result relying exclusively on the Supreme
Court's application of the equal protection clause in WHYY 3
34. There is language in the court's opinion indicating that in future cases, the Commonwealth must affirmatively come forth with justifications for a particular taxing scheme. After
noting that "[n]o justification is offered by the Commonwealth for the disparity in tax
rates," 360 A.2d at 596, the court acknowledged the state's "[failure] to point to any rational
reason for the difference in tax treatment." Id. The court summarized in its concluding
paragraph: "The Commonwealth has shown no valid reason for imposirig a higher tax rate
on . . . foreign corporations . . . . We therefore conclude that the tax . . . violates the
uniformity clause .... " Id. at 597.
35. 393 U.S. at 120.
36. The WHYY Court found no rational basis for the tax classification. Without such a
showing, and absent any basis which the Court itself could discern, it held that a classification based solely on the place of incorporation was an arbitrary classification and was violative of the equal protection clause. 393 U.S. at 120.
37. 360 A.2d at 594 n.3, 597.
38. Columbia's treatment of the appellant's argument that the tax measure in question
violated both the Pennsylvania uniformity clause and the Federal Constitution's equal protection clause leaves unclear the supreme court's position on the relationship between the two
constitutional provisions. The court found the appellant's equal protection argument
"meritorious," and the Supreme Court's reasoning in WHYY "equally applicable" to the case
before it. Id. at 594, 597. By expressly basing its holding on only the uniformity clause the
Columbia court may, however, be suggesting that in deciding future allegations of unequal
tax treatment the court will look to the state constitution, formulating its own standards.
Perhaps the supreme court concluded that reviewing state taxing schemes under the equal
protection clause, which would necessitate consideration of the United States Supreme
Court's treatment of identical or analogous claims, is unnecessary since the Commonwealth's
uniformity clause provides a ready means of assessing the legality of a particular tax. Although it was relatively clear under WHYY that classifying corporations by their state of
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By placing the burden on the Commonwealth to justify its tax
classifications, Columbia raises questions as to what the state must
show in order to justify a particular taxing scheme. While it is clear
that a classification based solely on place of incorporation is not
enough, beyond that, little is certain. The court did not deal with
whether there were any other justifiable reasons for the classification which would establish a rational basis for taxing domestic and
foreign corporations differently. It is possible the Commonwealth
could have demonstrated that regulating foreign corporations is
more costly than overseeing domestic businesses and therefore a
higher taxing rate is justified. Although there are indications in
Columbia that the Commonwealth might have met its burden had
it attempted to justify the disparate tax rates,39 Justice Roberts'
observation that the court could not itself discern any justification
for the classification" may indicate that under no circumstances
could this different treatment pass constitutional scrutiny under the
uniformity clause. More importantly, Justice Roberts' opinion may
indicate that the court is not yet willing to completely abandon the
past practice of seeking a legitimate basis for the classification and
upholding the scheme if it finds that such a basis exists." Since the
court did not expressly state that it would no longer provide conceivable justification for the Commonwealth's taxing measures, such a
possibility remains open. It would nonetheless seem prudent that in
structuring future taxing classifications, the General Assembly
should, through House or Senate debates, or by some other means,
articulate its reasons for a particular classification to ensure that it
survives judicial scrutiny.
Placing the burden on the Commonwealth to demonstrate some
actual justification for tax classificiations should be encouraged.2
incorporation, without more, violates the equal protection clause, other claims may arise
where the federal stance on the issue is not as clear.
39. See id. at 596-97: "But in the absence of some concrete justification for differences in
tax treatment, an arbitrary difference in tax rates cannot be tolerated." Justice Roberts also
observed: "The Commonwealth has shown no valid reason for imposing a higher tax rate
. . . . We therefore conclude that the tax is not . . . 'uniform ......
Id. at 597.
40. Id. at 595.
41. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
42. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HA~v. L. REv. 1 (1972), where the author analyzed the United
States Supreme Court's use of the minimal and strict scrutiny standards in relatively recent
decisions and identified a middle ground-means scrutiny-which he perceived as a standard
whereby the Court has determined whether the legislative means substantially furthered
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The minimal scrutiny standard has been regarded as an important
safeguard to the structure of the political process, allowing legislative value choices to stand without unwarranted judicial intervention.43 However, when a tax statute is challenged on constitutional
grounds, it may further the safeguarding of the political process,
and improve the substantive validity of legislative value choices, to
place the burden upon the Commonwealth to come forward with
some justifications for distinctive tax treatment.44 Not only does
such a standard promote legislative accountability, but it also
avoids judicial second-guessing of legislative ends. Columbia's
break from the traditional minimal scrutiny test might therefore
have salutary effects on the relationship between the judicial and
legislative branches, and on those lawmakers most concerned that
taxing classifications withstand possible constitutional challenges.
Jolene M. Grubb
legitimate legislative ends. Gunther suggested that this means scrutiny approach has been
utilized over the years to a limited extent, but putting a "new bite" into this old standard
would mean the courts would not be as willing to exercise their own "judicial imagination"
to supply justifying rationales. Id. at 21.
43. Id. at 21-22.
44. The means scrutiny test, as well as the standard utilized by the supreme court in
Columbia, could improve the quality of the political process by encouraging an airing of the
grounds for legislative action, thus directly promoting public consideration of the benefits
assertedly sought by the proposed legislation. See id. at 44.

